With the rapid expansion of the space industry, there has been a strong push to develop simple, reusable, and easy to deploy satellite system architecture solutions. In doing so, bus architecture has become a common design for a wide variety of space systems such as satellites, rovers and even space suits. The resilience of these devices is paramount, yet the cyber security practices of the space industry have long lagged those of other industries; much of this is due to limited perceived need for cyber security, instead, prioritizing simplicity and ease of access. It is critical that security be properly considered and addressed to ensure the viability of future space systems. Given the cyber-physical system constraints of space networks, it is critical that they can safely and efficiently operate with minimal human intervention. The modular design of a software bus makes it easy to remotely reconfigure, reuse and automate. This is intrinsic to the notion that every component connected to the bus can receive and send communications to other applications and modules on the system with limited restrictions. The fundamental software architecture should be based on a secure foundation. There should ideally be no unmitigated underlying cyber security vulnerabilities present in the fundamental design of the space network which could cause catastrophic failure on already deoloyed missions. Previous research into space system security has typically only focused on hypothetical scenarios or general principles of why space security is important. Our recent research has revealed that the design of modern Software-Bus (SB) dependant satellite systems are vulnerable to a serious security design weakness. Specifically, our research focused on analysing NASA's open source core Flight System (cFS), and it was shown that the software is vulnerable to a number of exploits. This paper summarizes and reviews the research and discovery of the novel vulnerabilities of cFS and bus dependant architecture. It also takes the next step in proposing a number of solutions which could be implemented to protect existing vulnerable bus dependant systems, and also new design principles which should be present at the inceptions of future space software architecture designs. Having a secure space network is a crucial baseline requirement to operate a mission with minimal human intervention. Our research has continued to explore potential solutions to secure bus-dependent systems which are currently deployed, without the need to redesign these systems from the ground up. The vulnerabilities and safeguards described here should motivate researchers and space system designers to ensure that the mission-critical infrastructure being sent into space is rigorously assessed for security.


    Access

    Check access

    Check availability in my library

    Order at Subito €


    Export, share and cite



    Title :

    Detection and Mitigation of Vulnerabilities in Space Network Software Bus Architectures


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2023-03-04


    Size :

    818890 byte




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



    Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation in V2G Networks

    Saba, Irum / Bukhari, Moomal / Ullah, Mukhtar et al. | Springer Verlag | 2023


    Airport front-of-house vulnerabilities and mitigation options

    Lord, Steven / Nunes-Vaz, Rick / Filinkov, Alexei et al. | Springer Verlag | 2010



    Detecting and patching network vulnerabilities

    CASELLA ALEX / SINGH MANU / COVELL GRANT | European Patent Office | 2022

    Free access

    DETECTING AND PATCHING NETWORK VULNERABILITIES

    CASELLA ALEX / SINGH MANU / COVELL GRANT | European Patent Office | 2020

    Free access