A game-theoretic approach to dynamic routing is proposed in order to maximize the traffic throughput on a freeway network. While existing methods of informing drivers of the approximate travel times for the alternative routes do not in general yield the system optimum, we can achieve a better performance by introducing a leader-follower game with monetary incentives. In particular, a control strategy is proposed in which the traffic authority (the leader) proposes a function that maps the possible travel times for a certain destination to positive or negative monetary incentives. Based on this function that is communicated via on-board computers, the drivers (followers) will rationally choose those travel times associated with an optimal distribution over the available routes. Finally, in return for the associated monetary value, the drivers are presented with a route that they should follow to the desired destination.


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    Title :

    Dynamic optimal routing based on a reverse stackelberg game approach


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2012-09-01


    Size :

    205684 byte





    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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