We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We characterize the approximation error and we derive a new monotonicity condition for a broad category of games that encompasses the problem under consideration. Next, we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm to calculate the routing as a variational generalized Nash equilibrium and demonstrate the solution’s benefits with numerical simulations. In the particular case of potential games, which emerges for linear latency functions, we explore a receding-horizon formulation of the routing problem, showing asymptotic convergence to destinations and analysing closed-loop performance dependence on horizon length through numerical simulations.


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    Title :

    Probabilistic Game-Theoretic Traffic Routing


    Contributors:

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2024-10-01


    Size :

    6589235 byte




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



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