In this paper, we address the much-anticipated deployment of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) in society by modeling and analyzing the social-mobility dilemma in a game-theoretic approach. We formulate this dilemma as a normal-form game of players making a binary decision for their mobility and construct an intuitive payoff function inspired by the socially beneficial outcomes of a mobility system consisting of CAVs. We show that the game is equivalent to the Prisoner’s dilemma, which implies that the rational collective decision is the opposite of the socially optimum. We present two different solutions to tackle this phenomenon: one with a preference structure and the other with institutional arrangements. We conclude by showcasing our last result with a numerical study.


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    Title :

    A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Social Impact of Connected and Automated Vehicles




    Publication date :

    2020-09-20


    Size :

    259201 byte




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English



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