The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter mission has as its primary objectives: advance our understanding of the current Mars climate, the processes that have formed and modified the surface of the planet, and the extent to which water has played a role in surface processes; identify sites of possible aqueous activity indicating environments that may have been or are conducive to biological activity; and thus, identify and characterize sites for future landed missions; and provide forward and return relay services for current and future Mars landed assets. MRO's crucial role in the long term strategy for Mars exploration requires a high level of reliability during its 5.4 year mission. This requires an architecture which incorporates extensive redundancy and cross-strapping. The overall MRO architecture is discussed in this context. Because of the distances and hence light-times involved, the spacecraft itself must be able to utilize this redundancy in responding to time-critical failures. The architecture of MRO's semi-autonomous Fault Protection (FP) software, known as SPIDER (Spacecraft Imbedded Distributed Error Response), is described. For cases where FP is unable to recognize a potentially threatening condition, either due to known limitations or software flaws, intervention by ground operations is required. Each of MRO's significant in-flight anomalies is examined, with lessons learned for redundancy and FP architectures and for ground operations.


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    Title :

    In-Flight Anomalies and Lessons Learned from the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Mission


    Contributors:


    Publication date :

    2008-03-01


    Size :

    1599534 byte





    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English