Highlights To manage contingent liabilities, government sets a charging mechanism of guarantee. Optimal BOT contract is investigated under a paid MTG program. A paid MTG program is at the expense of the social welfare. The impact of guarantee program on welfare loss is amplified by marginal social cost. The risk averse attitude would lower service quality and decrease social welfare.

    Abstract Government sectors often provide guarantees in build-operate-transfer (BOT) roads to attract private investments. Since a fiscal burden would be incurred from the contingent liability of issuing a guarantee, charging a fee for the guarantee is considered an effective remedy for management of contingent liabilities in practice. This study incorporates the charge mechanism for minimum traffic guarantee (MTG) into consideration, and proposes a method to choose the optimal concession contract variables with a paid MTG. We find that the government sector will specify a lower toll and a higher capacity for a BOT road with a paid MTG. As a result, the society suffers a social welfare loss when providing a paid MTG. Meanwhile, both the charging fee of an MTG and the guaranteed traffic volume would increase the loss of social welfare, which means the incentive mechanism of private participation and the management of contingent liabilities (charging fee for MTG) are all at the expense of social welfare. Moreover, since the welfare loss is magnified under a high marginal social cost condition, the government should set the charging fee and guaranteed traffic volume according to the marginal social cost level. In addition, to obtain more insights, this paper has made two extensions to further investigate the effects of a paid MTG when contracting with a risk averse private investor; when the concession period is an endogenous variable. Based on our model results, this paper derives several policy implications regarding BOT contract design when a paid MTG is provided.


    Access

    Check access

    Check availability in my library

    Order at Subito €


    Export, share and cite



    Title :

    Optimal choice of capacity, toll, and subsidy for build-operate-transfer roads with a paid minimum traffic guarantee


    Contributors:
    Shi, Shasha (author) / An, Qingxian (author) / Chen, Ke (author)


    Publication date :

    2020-06-25


    Size :

    27 pages




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English