Abstract Over the last decade, the demand for domestic and international flights in Korea has increased substantially. To meet the strong flight demands, several low cost carriers have begun to offer flight services. In addition, full service carriers have been motivated to establish their own subsidiary low cost carriers to maintain their market share against rival low cost carriers. This paper studies the management strategies of three kinds of airlines - full service carrier, its subsidiary low cost carrier and rival low cost carrier - based on game theory in the competitive air transport market. Each airline is assumed to act as a player and chooses strategies regarding airfare, flight frequency, and the number of operating aircrafts for specific routes while maximizing its own profits. Demand leakages between the airlines are considered in the flight demand function according to the selected strategies of all airlines. Through various game situations reflecting realistic features, this study provides managerial insights that can be applied in the competitive air transport market.
Highlights We dealt managerial decisions of three kinds of airlines at game theoretic situation. We considered airfare, flight frequency and the number of aircrafts of each airline. Demand of each airline is modeled with demand leakage among the three airlines. We assumed 4 kinds of game situations with a collusion/competition and a Stackelberg. We can get the insights from three airlines' behaviors from each game situation.
An airline's management strategies in a competitive air transport market
Journal of Air Transport Management ; 50 ; 53-61
2015-10-28
9 pages
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
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