Highlights A parking competition game where vehicles compete for parking spaces. Equilibrium assignments are described as a system of nonlinear equations. Optimum price vectors of parking spaces are characterized as a union of polyhedrons. Valid price vectors are introduced to ensure system optimum. Robust price vectors are designed to achieve the best worst-case outcome.
Abstract This paper considers a parking competition game where a finite number of vehicles from different origins compete for the same number of parking spaces located at various places in a downtown area to minimize their own parking costs. If one vehicle reaches a desired vacant parking space before another vehicle, it will occupy the space and the other vehicle would have to search elsewhere. We first present a system of nonlinear equations to describe the equilibrium assignment of parking spaces to vehicles, and then discuss optimal pricing schemes that steer such parking competition to a system optimum assignment of parking spaces. These schemes are characterized by a union of polyhedrons. Given that the equilibrium state of parking competition is not unique, we further introduce a valid price vector to ensure that the parking competition outcome will always be system optimum. A sufficient condition is provided for the existence of such a valid price vector. Lastly, we seek for a robust price vector that yields the best worst-case outcome of the parking competition.
Pricing of parking games with atomic players
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological ; 73 ; 1-12
2014-12-05
12 pages
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
Pricing of parking games with atomic players
Online Contents | 2015
|Transportation Research Record | 2016
|Elsevier | 2021
|Managing parking with progressive pricing
Elsevier | 2023
|A Parking Pricing Model with Parking Behavior in City
ASCE | 2011
|