AbstractThe management model of airports has long stood as a central research area in the transport sector. There are a wide range of studies that focus on the potential benefits and pitfalls of private airport management. The results of these efficiency studies have not provided irrefutable evidence for the superiority of private management over public management, but the momentum towards privatizing airports is growing. The reason for privatization has been more related with privatization revenues for governments, rather than more efficient management. The search for maximizing the sale value can have negative impacts from a welfare perspective, for example, through excessive increases in tariffs for passengers. This research reflects on the motivations for governments to privatize, and is illustrated by a case study – Portugal – in which the privatization occurred as a result of three main large drivers: 1) a bailout programme by the IMF, the EU, and the ECB; 2) a revision of the regulatory model, and; 3) the need to increase the capacity of Lisbon's airport system in the medium term.
HighlightsPrivatization processes should not be conducted under economic and budgetary downturns.Maximizing selling price can jeopardize social welfare.Decision makers should carefully consider “unbundling” before privatization processes.
Airport privatization with public finances under stress: An analysis of government and investor's motivations
Journal of Air Transport Management ; 62 ; 197-203
2017-04-27
7 pages
Article (Journal)
Electronic Resource
English
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