In externality problem, administrator, supervisor and enterprise who release pollution construct three-tier hierarchy of principal, the third part and agent construction. In this paper, the model of that-under situation of supervisor is honest or not, as a principal, according to the information which was supplied by supervisor, administrator allows or not allows enterprise to collusion between the other two parts-is established. And, through analysis and demonstration of related cost and model, the optimal range of the collusion was got. At last, simulated calculation and conclusion were achieved.


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    Title :

    Externality Problem Based on Collusion Theory


    Contributors:
    Wang, Li-na (author) / Di, Yan-biao (author)

    Conference:

    First International Conference on Transportation Engineering ; 2007 ; Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China



    Publication date :

    2007-07-09




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




    Externality Problem Based on Collusion Theory

    Wang, L.-n. / Di, Y.-b. / China Communications and Transportation Association; Transportation & Development Institute (American Society of Civil Engineers) | British Library Conference Proceedings | 2007


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