This paper intends to find out consistent dynamic variable pricing setting and dynamic user equilibrium. The interaction between dynamic variable pricing and dynamic traffic assignment is first formulated as a model of one-level Cournot game in which the traffic authority and road users can select their strategies at the same time. Then it is formulated as a model of bi-level Stackelberg game in which the traffic authority is leader while the users are followers.


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    Title :

    Game-Theoretic Analysis of Interaction between Dynamic Variable Pricing and Dynamic Traffic Assignment


    Contributors:
    Zhou, Xizhao (author) / Zhou, Bayi (author) / Li, Yan (author)

    Conference:

    Eighth International Conference on Applications of Advanced Technologies in Transportation Engineering (AATTE) ; 2004 ; Beijing, China



    Publication date :

    2004-05-13




    Type of media :

    Conference paper


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English




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