Based on price mechanisms, a Stackelberg non-cooperation game model between airport and airline was proposed to deal with the aircraft pushback slot allocation problem. The optimization objectivess of this model are to reduce the loss of airport caused by both ground-holding after pushback and the price mechanism and balance the pushback cost between airlines. In the process of gambling, the airport first determines the price of pushback slot, the airline then "play games" between price and other competitors’ strategies and return the gambling result to the airport. The artificial fish swarm algorithm is put forward for solving the integrated model. Through the case studies, the rationality and validity of the model has been proved. The research result shows that the model can generate optimal equilibrium solution to both the individual users as well as the whole system, finally reaching collective rationality and game equilibrium.
Non-Cooperation Game Model for Aircraft Pushback Slot Allocation Based on Price Mechanism
15th COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals ; 2015 ; Beijing, China
CICTP 2015 ; 69-80
2015-07-13
Conference paper
Electronic Resource
English
A Pushback Slot Allocation Equilibrium Model Based on Game Theory
Trans Tech Publications | 2013
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