The feasibility of the so-called marginal-cost pricing principle for providing an anonymous link toll (uniform toll across all individuals) pattern in a network with multiple user classes is investigated. The social and spatial inequality issues caused by the anonymous tolling are also addressed. It was assumed that the classes of users differed from one another in un-observable ways: they placed different values on the same amount of money, and they perceived travel disutility in money or time units. These characteristics precluded the possibility of nonanonymous or discriminatory tolling. Specifically, answers to the following questions were sought. Was the bicriterion user equilibrium flow the same as the single-criterion (in time or monetary units) flow in the presence of road pricing? Did the marginal-cost pricing principle suggest an anonymous link toll pattern that could support the multiclass, bicriterion user equilibrium flow pattern as a system optimum? In addition, models for selecting the most equitable anonymous link toll pattern that could lead to a system optimum were derived.


    Zugriff

    Download

    Verfügbarkeit in meiner Bibliothek prüfen

    Bestellung bei Subito €


    Exportieren, teilen und zitieren



    Titel :

    Optimal Tolls with a Multiclass, Bicriterion Traffic Network Equilibrium


    Weitere Titelangaben:

    Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board


    Beteiligte:
    Yin, Yafeng (Autor:in) / Yang, Hai (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    01.01.2004




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch





    Nonnegative Pareto-Improving Tolls with Multiclass Network Equilibria

    Song, Ziqi / Yin, Yafeng / Lawphongpanich, Siriphong | Transportation Research Record | 2009



    Bicriterion Traffic Equilibrium: T2 Model, Algorithm, and Software Overview

    Dial, Robert B. | Transportation Research Record | 2000