To avoid traffic congestion, the problem of path planning for intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) is studied in this paper. Exist a cloud computing center (CCC) that can get real-time information of all ICVs and then plan the path of ICVs from a global perspective. Under Stackelberg game theory, an incentive strategy is designed to incentivize each ICVs to choose the path planned by the CCC, such that the global cost is minimized without reducing profits of all ICVs. To demonstrate the validity of the obtained results, a numerical example is presented.


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    Titel :

    An Incentive Stackelberg Strategy Towards Intelligent Connected Vehicles


    Beteiligte:
    Liu, Fen (Autor:in) / Liang, Weihao (Autor:in) / Meng, Wei (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    15.10.2021


    Format / Umfang :

    349888 byte




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch



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