In this paper, the problems of road congestion and travel efficiency are solved by designing a Stackelberg incentive mechanism. Based on the game theory, the Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) are treated as the followers and the Dispatching Center (DC) as a leader in the Stackelberg incentive mechanism. As the information of other ICVs may not be completely obtained, the respective Nash equilibrium solutions of the optimal route under two different conditions are obtained. By designing the Stackelberg incentive mechanism, the profit function of the DC and the utility function of each ICV is maximized simultaneously when all ICVs choose the optimal routes. Finally, using numerical simulations, the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism for two different conditions is proved.


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    Titel :

    Application of Stackelberg incentive mechanism in vehicle dispatching


    Beteiligte:
    Li, Zhiheng (Autor:in) / Liu, Fen (Autor:in) / Meng, Wei (Autor:in)


    Erscheinungsdatum :

    27.06.2022


    Format / Umfang :

    1009994 byte





    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Konferenz)


    Format :

    Elektronische Ressource


    Sprache :

    Englisch




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