We consider a target selection problem for multitarget tracking in a multifunction radar network from a game-theoretic perspective. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game. The radars are considered to be players in this game with utilities modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and their strategies are the observed targets whose number is known. Initially, for the problem of coordination, the Nash equilibria are characterized and, in order to find equilibria points, a distributed algorithm based on the best response dynamics is proposed. Afterward, the analysis is extended to the case of partial target observability and radar connectivity and heterogeneous interests among radars. The solution concept of correlated equilibria is employed and a distributed algorithm based on the regret matching is proposed. The proposed algorithms are shown to perform well compared to the centralized approach of significantly higher complexity.
Target Selection for Tracking in Multifunction Radar Networks: Nash and Correlated Equilibria
IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems ; 54 , 5 ; 2448-2462
2018-10-01
2093421 byte
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Tema Archiv | 1990
|BASE | 2018
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British Library Online Contents | 2002
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