© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ; This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized non-cooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non-cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems. ; Peer Reviewed ; Postprint (author's final draft)
Non-centralized control for flow-based distribution networks: a game-theoretical insight
2017-09-01
Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
DDC: | 629 |
Non-centralized control for flow-based distribution networks: A game-theoretical insight
BASE | 2017
|NTIS | 1970
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