In actual economic life, information required is asymmetric between the third party logistics enterprises and demanders. It is difficult for the third party logistic enterprises to understand willingness-to-pay of each potential demander. To avoid arbitrary pricing for logistics services, the third party logistics enterprises can use information-discriminating principle and mechanism design principle to design an optimal consumption combination sequence, so as to demonstrate the actual demand pattern of logistics demanders, maximizing customer utility and profits of logistics enterprises. This paper discusses about determination of nonlinear optimal pricing in monopoly market where logistics demanders having high-demand or low-demand exist, so as to give references to pricing standard for logistics enterprises.
Optimal Pricing Model for Monopoly Third Party Logistics Enterprises under Information Asymmetry
Second International Conference on Transportation Engineering ; 2009 ; Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China
2009-07-29
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
Optimal Pricing Model for Monopoly Third Party Logistics Enterprises under Information Asymmetry
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