Based on principal — agent theory and methods, the problem for the principal how to incite the third-party logistics to do his best to decrease the logistics cost under information asymmetry has been discussed in the paper. Generally, the principal can not learn about the work of the agent for cost reduction due to information asymmetry, it has been presented that the principal may determine a contract base number according to his own requirements and quote by the third Party on logistics, and establish the model of maximizing the principal's expected service utility on condition that constriction of individual rationality and that of incentive compatibility constraint for the third party are satisfied, in which the reward factor and the penalty factor are used as dominant decision-making factor.
Analysis on Cost Control Model for Outsourcing Logistics for Enterprises under Information Asymmetry
Second International Conference on Transportation Engineering ; 2009 ; Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China
2009-07-29
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Elektronische Ressource
Englisch
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