Two players sequentially locate a fixed number of facilities, competing to capture market share. Facilities face disruption risks, and each customer patronizes the nearest operational facility, regardless of who operates it. The problem therefore combines competitive location and location with disruptions. This combination has been absent from the literature. We model the problem as a Stackelberg game in which the leader locates facilities first, followed by the follower, and formulate the leader's decision problem as a bilevel optimization problem. A variable neighborhood decomposition search heuristic which includes variable fixing and cut generation is developed. Computational results suggest that high quality solutions can be found quickly. Interesting managerial insights are drawn.


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    Title :

    The competitive facility location problem under disruption risks




    Publication date :

    2016




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Print


    Language :

    English



    Classification :

    BKL:    85.00 / 55.82 Güterverkehr