The Army initiated the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter as the Light Helicopter Family (LHX) in 1983 with early cost estimates of five million dollars per helicopter. In March 2004, after 22 years, 6 program restructurings, and 6.9 billion dollars, the Army Chief of Staff terminated the Comanche with the intent to reallocate 14.6 billion dollars programmed through 2011 to restructure Army Aviation. This paper explores the possibility that shortsighted threat analysis coupled with flawed group consensus within the Army allowed the Comanche Helicopter Program to continue through two decades despite intense Congressional scrutiny. Army senior level leadership safeguarded a helicopter program that did not adequately explore alternatives to transformation even when the threat environment called for a change in strategy. The Army's failure to adequately foster critical thinking about aviation threats resulted in a current helicopter force that was not adequately postured for the Global War on Terror.


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    Title :

    Comanche Helicopter Program - A Strategic Failure


    Contributors:

    Publication date :

    2007


    Size :

    21 pages


    Type of media :

    Report


    Type of material :

    No indication


    Language :

    English





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