Deterrence was a strategy of the Cold War. It guided the development of strategic concepts even when nonnuclear operations were the predominant concern of the US military, including conventional warfare in Korea and Europe and counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia. Today our understanding of deterrence has atrophied. In fact, deterrence has been incarcerated into one of two holding cells, as if it were some kind of contagion that requires quarantine. For all operations that might involve employment of nuclear weapons, campaign planning has become the exclusive jurisdiction of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Even there, deterrence is but one of six missions.1 For the geographic combatant commands, deterrence is confined to one phase of a joint campaign, one that is most often more hope than plan. Phase 2 of the joint campaign, 'Deterrence,' has in fact become mostly all about moving forces into the theater for the purpose of seizing the initiative or mounting a defense rather than deterring the conflict from happening altogether. This conceptual decline occurred for no apparent reasons. In the 1990s, many became convinced that our conventional combat power was so superior we did not need nuclear weapons to deter conventional capabilities would be sufficient. Then in the beginning of the twenty-first century we became--rightly--focused on winning the war against violent extremists and conducting counterinsurgency campaigns.
Deterrence at the Operational Level of War
2011
23 pages
Report
No indication
English
Behavior & Society , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Nuclear weapons , Military strategy , Deterrence , Combat effectiveness , Conventional warfare , Command and control systems , Cold war , Power , Korea , Military planning , Southeast asia , Strategic communications , Counterinsurgency , Warfare , Reprints , Quarantine , Europe