The objective of this project has been to develop an alternative subsidy regime that provides incentives for the Norwegian State Railways (NSB) to develop optimal service levels. The problem is defined by the facts that NSB is a profit maximizing company, and that the demand side is characterized by external effects and considerable input, mainly in terms of time and money, by the passengers themselves. The project has developed an existing simulation model in order to recommend subsidy arrangements and other conditions that incentivise market efficient solutions. The report recommends specific subsidy levels per passenger, per train-kilometer and for delivered capacity. In addition a bonus/malus system based on punctuality is recommended. Threshold levels for passenger satisfaction, beyond which the contract should be renegotiated, should be set as a framework condition for the contract regime.


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    Title :

    Utvikling av Kvalitetskonstrakter for NSB AS' Intercity-Marked: Sammendragsrapport (Developing Quality Contracts for the Norwegian State Railways' Intercity Market)


    Contributors:
    N. Fearnley (author) / B. Norheim (author)

    Publication date :

    2002


    Size :

    32 pages



    Type of media :

    Report


    Type of material :

    No indication


    Language :

    English