Over the last two and a half decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has invested heavily in the modernization of its military forces. These efforts have yielded dramatic improvements in the personnel, organizational structure, equipment, training, doctrine, and overall proficiency of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China’s air, space, and missile forces in particular—collectively referred to here as the PLA’s “aerospace forces”—have transformed rapidly from a comparatively low base of capabilities in the 1990s into forces that today could pose significant challenges to any opponent. China’s military leaders have observed the evolution of other nations’ forces and have taken lessons from recent conflicts. They have sought to rebuild their own aerospace capabilities with these changes in mind. China seeks to modernize its aerospace forces—including weapons, equipment, personnel, and organizational structure—to support an increasingly ambitious regional security strategy that involves deterring any adversary, and, should deterrence fail, prevailing in combat.At the start of 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his role as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s Military Commission (CMC), announced major structural reforms to the PLA. Notably, Xi elevated the PLA’s Second Artillery Force (PLASAF)—once an independent branch of the PLA—to service-level stature on par with the three other services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and renamed it the “PLA Rocket Force” (PLARF).1 The PLARF has historically been charged with developing nuclear strike and counterstrike options, but its mission and capabilities have grown since the early 1990s to include carrying out conventional ballistic and cruise missile strikes. Xi also established the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) to support joint combat operations in space and to conduct operations in the electromagnetic spectrum. Although the full details are unclear at the time of this writing,the PLASSF appears to be responsible for providing space-based reconnaissance, communication, and positioning capabilities and for maintaining situational awareness of objects in earth orbit, as well as for cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.2 The PLASSF may also be charged with developing counter-space capabilities.


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    Title :

    Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces


    Publication date :

    2015


    Size :

    92 pages


    Type of media :

    Report


    Type of material :

    No indication


    Language :

    English