This paper addresses the Navy' posture on mine warfare (MIW). The purpose is to examine the perception that the Navy's MIW capabilities are inadequate and that appropriate corrective actions are not being taken. Despite MIW's lack of strong congressional sponsorship enjoyed by other warfare specialties, the Navy has developed a highly capable and responsive force of mine countermeasures (MCM) helicopters and ocean-going vessels, as well as the capability of providing limited MCM through the Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP). Even though a high proportion of MCM capability resides in the Naval Reserve Force, the channel survey and conditioning function they perform contributes directly to the readiness posture of the active Navy. The Navy's MIW posture is not bankrupt, but is vital and forward looking. Recommendations provided include expanding the COOP, protecting the Reserve MCM role, and institutionalizing the benefit of MIW experience among the officer corps.
Is the Navy's Mine Warfare Posture Bankrupt
1991
33 pages
Report
No indication
English
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Mine warfare , Operational readiness , Active duty , Channels , Helicopters , Military reserves , Mine countermeasures , Naval personnel , Navy , Oceans , Officer personnel , Perception , Posture(General) , Surveys , MIW(Mine Warfare) , Naval operations , MCM(Mine Countermeasures) , COOP(Craft of Opportunity Program)
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