The National Military Strategy relied on the Reserve Component, specifically the Army National Guard, as a strategic as opposed to an operational reserve prior to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the early 1990s. With the onset of the global war on terrorism in 2001, operationally ready Army National Guard forces are necessary to meet and sustain the troop requirements of the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC). Readiness and effective employment of the Army National Guard requires a mission set and policy to ensure continuous engagement with viable missions for readiness and continued partnership with the Active Component. This paper examines the United States historical reliance on militia and reserve component forces to provide for the defense of the nation. It will examine the Army's implementation of the Abrams doctrine and transition to a total force. It also examines the feasibility and challenges of maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational reserve and the implications of maintaining operational readiness. Finally, it will conclude with some insights into the way ahead for sustaining the Army National Guard as an operational force for the twenty-first century.
National Guard: An Operational Force for the 21st Century
2013
34 pages
Report
No indication
English
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