The Army Air Forces entered World War II poorly equipped and underprepared to support ground commanders with photographic and visual reconnaissance. While doctrine fared better, it lacked the depth needed to employ reconnaissance effectively from the outset. In the Mediterranean theater, one can trace reconnaissance employment in support of ground forces. Operations in North Africa frequently failed due to decentralized control and inadequate aircraft. Photographic reconnaissance improved markedly for the invasion of Sicily, but lost relevancy after the invasion when ground forces often outpaced photographic coverage. Visual reconnaissance supplemented this coverage during mobile operations, but lacked sufficient detail for wide area coverage. The same situation persisted in Italy when aerial reconnaissance supported the Fifth Army. However, the Fifth Army achieved a greater degree of success by effectively securing tactical control over photographic and visual reconnaissance assets supporting its operations. Combined with liaison officers at all echelons, this unique situation proved quite effective for all levels during attacks against fixed defenses, but less effective at the division level and below during mobile operations due to time delays. The experience gained in this theater helps to explain the Army's current focus on obtaining unmanned aerial vehicles to minimize bureaucracy and improve intelligence timeliness.


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