More than 1,250,000 tons of shipping was sunk or damaged in the last five months of World War II when Twenty-first Bomber Command executed an aerial mining campaign against Japan known as Operation STARVATION. Despite this outstanding success, the decision to commit the still unproven B-29 to minelaying was a close one that rose to the highest levels of the Services. The decision to conduct Operation STARVATION was made not only because mining would lead to a Japanese surrender without the need for a costly invasion of the home islands, but also with an eye towards post-war roles and missions for the Air Force. Once the decision was taken, General Curtis LeMay and his Twenty-first Bomber Command threw themselves wholeheartedly into the mission. On January 23, 1945, LeMay issued a general directive to the 313th Bombardment Wing to prepare for minelaying operations and on March 27, the 313th flew the first of over 50 mining missions. Working together on the remote island of Tinian, Air Force and Navy personnel turned a mission that began as an inter-service rivalry into one of the best examples of inter-service cooperation of the Pacific War. This essay will examine the decision making process that led to the use of the B-29 for aerial mining, the planning and execution of Operation Starvation, and the results of the mining campaign.
Operation Starvation
2002
22 pages
Report
No indication
English
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