Highlights One-population evolutionary game is proposed to analyze manufacturers’ strategies. Manufacturers should choose to adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) or not. The effect of CSR effort on pricing decisions and payoff functions are analyzed. CSR strategy is evolutionarily stable and as a better strategy will be evolved. Socially concerned manufacturer takes chance on increasing its selling price.

    Abstract With the growing consciousness of social sustainability, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a serious challenge to manufacturers. This paper analytically analyzes pricing strategy and long-term behavior of socially concerned manufacturers through a one-population evolutionary game theory. Considering two main strategies, i.e., non-CSR and CSR, we investigate what strategy will eventually be the best strategy for the manufacturers and which strategy will eventually be chosen by the majority of the manufacturers. Besides, analytical sensitivity analyses and managerial insights are derived which reveal that a socially concerned manufacturer can offer a higher price for its products compared to a profit-maximizing manufacturer.


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    Title :

    An evolutionary game theoretic model for analyzing pricing strategy and socially concerned behavior of manufacturers




    Publication date :

    2019-07-15


    Size :

    20 pages




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English





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