AbstractThis paper proposes a game theoretic framework for the problem of designing an uncapacitated railway transit network in the presence of link failures and a competing mode. It is assumed that when a link fails, another path or another transportation mode is provided to transport passengers between the endpoints of the affected link. The goal is to build a network that optimizes a certain utility function when failures occur. The problem is posed as a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game with perfect information. The saddle points of the corresponding mixed enlarged game yield robust network designs.


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    Title :

    A game theoretic framework for the robust railway transit network design problem


    Contributors:

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2009-08-31


    Size :

    13 pages




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English





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