The problem of designing a false-data injection attack on a model predictive controlled system is considered with 1) limited knowledge of the plant, constraints, and controller characteristics; and 2) the ability to remain undetected by common set-membership-based anomaly detectors. More precisely, it is shown that it is possible for an attacker to estimate a priori the unknown disturbance set and then use this knowledge to masquerade as a disturbance and drive the plant to a desired (by the attacker) target. This attack is illustrated on the linearized longitudinal dynamics of a Boeing 747 benchmark model.


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    Title :

    Confiscating Flight Control System by Stealthy Output Injection Attack


    Contributors:

    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2017-03-29


    Size :

    11 pages




    Type of media :

    Article (Journal)


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English





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