Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption{that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments


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    Title :

    Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions : Structuring the Sale of Club Goods



    Published in:

    Publication date :

    2021


    Size :

    1 Online-Ressource


    Remarks:

    illustrations (black and white)
    Campusweiter Zugriff (Universität Hannover) - Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots.



    Type of media :

    Book


    Type of material :

    Electronic Resource


    Language :

    English







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    Forecast Sale of Goods Using the ``BROWN'' Method

    Nistor, R. / Nistor, C. / Muntean, M.-C. et al. | British Library Conference Proceedings | 2010