We consider the price promotion in a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and one retailer, who take into account the reference price effects of consumers. The problem is analyzed as a manufacturer-lead Stackelberg game. The results indicate that reference price effects could mitigate "double marginalization" effects, and improve the channel efficiency. We also show that the optimal price promotion benefits the manufacturer, retailer and consumers in consumer promotion model. Furthermore, we provide the conditions under which the retailer has an interest in offering price promotion to consumers. Finally, we employ numerical analysis to demonstrate more managerial insights.


    Zugriff

    Zugriff über TIB

    Verfügbarkeit in meiner Bibliothek prüfen

    Bestellung bei Subito €


    Exportieren, teilen und zitieren



    Titel :

    Price promotion with reference price effects in supply chain


    Beteiligte:
    Zhibing Lin (Autor:in)

    Erschienen in:

    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2016




    Medientyp :

    Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)


    Format :

    Print


    Sprache :

    Englisch



    Klassifikation :

    BKL:    85.00 / 55.82 Güterverkehr