Presently, there are three avenues by which Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations are authorized in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS): obtaining either (i) a certificate of authorization (COA), or (ii) a special airworthiness certificate (SAC) in either the experimental, or the restricted category, or (iii) an exemption from an airworthiness certificate together with a civil COA. The first is meant primarily for public entities, such as NASA; the remaining two are the only available means for civil UAS operations. Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also proposed a regulatory framework targeted for certain small UAS, specifically those weighing 55 pounds or less, although final rulemaking remains pending. We have previously shown how an assurance case can aggregate heterogeneous reasoning and safety evidence, with application to UAS safety. In this paper, we describe how assurance cases can serve as a common framework to justify overall system safety, unifying both operational aspects and airworthiness, in particular system design assurance. We also show how this approach can coexist with, and augment, existing safety analysis processes and best-practices, by transforming the artifacts they produce into structured assurance arguments. To illustrate the applicability and utility of our approach, we have been applying it for the design assurance of an unmanned rotorcraft system, intended for precision agriculture operations, as part of the NASA Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project.
Argument-Based Airworthiness Assurance of Small UAS
DASC Digital Avionics Systems Conference ; 2015 ; Prague, Czechoslovakia
13.09.2015
Aufsatz (Konferenz)
Keine Angabe
Englisch
ARgument-based airworthiness assurance of small UAS
IEEE | 2015
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British Library Conference Proceedings | 1998
|Role of Nondestructive Inspections in Airworthiness Assurance
British Library Conference Proceedings | 1998
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