This study investigates the Army's role in naval gunfire support, in light of the current force reductions and changing military missions. The discussion focuses upon naval gunfire training and pre-deployment planning and coordination for naval gunfire support of contingency operations. During the initial stages of a contingency operation, the Army relies upon other services for fire support until sufficient Army field artillery and aviation attack assets are available. Fixed-wing air support and naval gunfire provide this initial support. Naval gunfire for the Army was not coordinated during pre-deployment planning for operations Urgent Fury Just Cause, or Desert Shield. This study explains the Army's dependence upon the Marine Corps for the planning and coordination of naval gunfire support. It promotes methods to decrease this dependence by improving the field artillery community's naval gunfire training and awareness. The analysis addresses institutional
Naval Gunfire Support: An Army Role in a New World Order
1992
193 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Fire Control & Bombing Systems , Naval gunnery , Artillery , Attack , Awareness , Fire support , Gunfire , Marine corps , Reduction , Training , Theses , Naval gunfire support , Joint military activities , Military planning , Naval gunfire training , Army operations , Military missions , Navy
NTIS | 1967
|NTIS | 1967
|Naval Gunfire Training Without the Training Range
British Library Conference Proceedings | 2003
|