The 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan commenced with a notably effective invasion. However, it ended a decade later with the withdrawal of Soviet forces after a costly and ineffectual war. This paper will analyze the Soviet military strategy for the intervention and examine how initial success turned into ultimate failure. Specifically, it will show that the Soviets did not achieve their political objectives in Afghanistan due to miscalculations of human and moral factors resident in the Afghan insurgency, rigidity in doctrine and strategy that disallowed effective adaptation to changing circumstances, inherent weaknesses in the Soviet political and military system, and the ultimate realization that the costs of the war far exceeded its potential benefits.
From Successful Invasion to Failed War: An Analysis of Soviet Military Strategy in Afghanistan 1979-1989
2002
16 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
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