As the Navy returns to near-peer competition and the potential for operations in a communication denied environment, mission command has been proposed as a mitigator to the loss of traditional command and control (C2) procedures. Unfortunately, mission command is not a stand-alone administrative or planning function, but a philosophy of fighting that requires a pre-existing ecosystem to function properly. Mission command is poorly suited to the modern Navy both in general and under communications-denied environments specifically, due to its command structure, exquisite platforms, and dependence on information warfare. This paper will address how the unique nature of the Navy undermines many benefits of mission command due to the Navy's centralized nature, shared informational picture, and composite warfare doctrine (CWD). It will also look at how the exquisite platforms that the Navy employs are poorly suited to utilize mission command due to the increased risk to capital assets, lack of a reserve force, and the high-level approval required for many actions. Finally, this paper will demonstrate that no C2system (mission command or otherwise) will solve the problems arising from communications degraded environments due to the decrease in situational awareness, loss of over the horizon (OTH) targeting, and the limits of line of sight (LOS) communication.
Mission Command Will Not Save the Navy
2020
21 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch