This thesis seeks to determine if Joint and Army doctrine support attack helicopters in air-only operations. It focuses on Operation Allied Force and the role that Task Force Hawk was assigned. The premise being that because Task Force Hawk lacked a ground maneuver force, Allied Force was unlike any operation the attack helicopters had previously participated in. The thesis, through historical analysis, determines that there exist tensions between the Army and Air Force over the use of attack helicopters. These tensions cloud current discussion over helicopter use. Next, the thesis examines Joint and Army doctrine to determine if the task assigned to the attack helicopters had doctrinal foundation. Finally, the study examines the predeployment training, task organization, and in-country training for the helicopter crews to determine if their preparation was consistent with the requirements of the operations.
Joint Doctrine and Task Force Hawk: Lessons for the New Millennium
2000
89 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk
NTIS | 2002
|RAF-RN link for Joint Force 2000 . Sikorsky studies higher weight Black Hawk
Online Contents | 1999
Engineering Index Backfile | 1950
Emerald Group Publishing | 1975