Five years ago, the average military service member had limited knowledge of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), even though they had been around for several decades. Today, all military personnel have at least some knowledge of UAVs due to news covering the Predator UAV and UAV support to deployed battalions. Over the past two years, UAV support at the battalion level has proven indispensable to the complex targeting process that units have faced in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As a result, the need for UAV support at the battalion level has become imperative to mission accomplishment. The Dragon Eye UAV is being fielded to the battalions to provide an organic UAV capability that better supports the battalion than the unreliable general support UAVs that higher headquarters provides. The argument that battalions do not need a UAV that directly supports them can be discounted by the numerous situations in which Dragon Eye was employed by 3/1 to accomplish its mission when general support UAVs were not available. If a commander does not own an asset, he cannot rely on its support. As such, general support UAVs are useful when available, but the battalion is left floundering when it counts on UAV support and receives none. The battalion needs the dedicated UAV such as Dragon Eye at their level so they can plan accordingly and employ/task the asset to best accomplish their mission vice the unreliable general support UAVs that higher headquarters provides.


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    Dragon Wagon

    Lockheed,US | Kraftfahrwesen | 1979



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    K. B. Watman / D. P. Raymer | NTIS | 1994