The preponderance of conflicts fought over the last 70 years have included or have been centered on irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. Indeed, the helicopter's first significant trials in combat took place during the Algerian War (1954-1962), the Vietnam War (1955-1975), and the Soviet- Afghan War (1979-1989). During these wars, French, American, and Soviet militaries used significant numbers of helicopters to fight insurgents and guerrillas, and each country lost the conflict. As conventional organizations, these militaries used helicopters to seek military dominance, often blind to or in spite of politico-strategic goals like legitimacy. The helicopter's firepower and mobility tactically decimated insurgents, but the nature of irregular warfare rendered tactical dominance indecisive. Helicopters were indecisive or bad at enabling legitimacy, population control, and isolation, key tenets of successful COIN. Convinced that helicopter-enabled military dominance could win, the French, American, and Soviet militaries were unable to balance the pursuit of military and politically objectives. Air mobility distracted their leaders from focusing on the political aspects of counterinsurgency.


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