The United States has seen a three-decade-long history of poor outcomes in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development efforts. Technical problems have led to cost and schedule increases as well as to disappointing operational results. Costs have tended to escalate so much during development that the resulting systems have cost more than users have been willing to pay, precipitating program cancellation in almost every case. This history prompted the unique developmental approach adopted at the beginning of the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UAV) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. There has also been a long history of efforts made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of weapon system acquisition policy, processes, and management for all weapon system types. Capturing the experience from ongoing or recently completed efforts employing nonstandard or innovative acquisition strategies can facilitate such improvements. This research contributes to that effort. In 1994, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), began the development of two UAVs. These systems were intended to provide surveillance information to the warfighter. As such, they responded both to the recommendations of the Defense Science Board and to operational needs stated by DARO on behalf of military service users.


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    Titel :

    Innovative Development. Global Hawk and Darkstar. Volume 3: Transitions Within and Out of the HAE UAV ACTD Program


    Beteiligte:
    J. A. Drezner (Autor:in) / R. S. Leonard (Autor:in)

    Erscheinungsdatum :

    2002


    Format / Umfang :

    97 pages


    Medientyp :

    Report


    Format :

    Keine Angabe


    Sprache :

    Englisch