The Soviets have long understood the prerequisites for achieving combat success at the operational and tactical levels of war. Among these prerequisites is the necessity for conducting efficient, rapid maneuver. Long-term Soviet belief in the utility of operational maneuver is well-documented in Soviet military works and, to an increasing degree, in Western analyses of Soviet operational techniques. Western appreciation of Soviet concern for tactical maneuver, however, is less mature. Most Western analyses portray Soviet tactical combat measures collectively as steamroller tactics, characterized by Soviet use of overwhelming, deeply echeloned concentrations of forces committed to combat in conjunction with massive amounts of fire support. Once this massive force has disrupted or destroyed enemy tactical defenses, then, and only then, do Soviet operational maneuver forces go into action, using maneuver to project forces deep into the enemy rear. This Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde characterization of Soviet offensive techniques postulates early reliance on concentrated forces attacking in basically linear fashion followed by wholesale reversion to artful, flexible operational maneuver. Centralized control, inflexibility, and commensurate de-emphasis of initiative characterize the early (penetration) phase. Understandably, most Westerners question whether the Soviet Army can adjust to meet the requirements of the exploitation phase. Keywords: Reprints. (kr)
Spearhead of the Attack: The Role of the Forward Detachment in Tactical Maneuver
1988
53 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
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