After a lengthy hiatus -- lasting nearly six centuries -- China is reemerging as a maritime power, this time with an emphasis on undersea warfare. Between 1996 and 2006, the Chinese navy took delivery of more than thirty submarines. These vessels include two new classes of nuclear submarines -- the advanced Song-class diesel submarines and the Yuan class of diesel boats -- which, according to some reports, was a surprise for U.S. intelligence. Above and beyond this ambitious naval construction program, the People's Republic of China (PRC) received during 2005-06 an additional eight formidable Kilo-class submarines (and associated weaponry), which were purchased in 2002, to add to the four it already operated. A new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island may well herald a new era of more extended Chinese submarine operations. Much discussion among East Asian security analysts now centers on Beijing's potential development and deployment of aircraft carriers. However, at least in the near term, this discussion amounts to a red herring. For the foreseeable future, China does not seek to 'rule the waves' writ large but rather is seeking the much narrower and more realizable objective of dominating the East Asian littoral. While photos of a first Chinese carrier will no doubt cause a stir, the Chinese navy has in recent times focused much attention upon a decidedly more mundane and nonphotogenic arena of naval warfare: sea mines. This focus has, in combination with other asymmetric forms of naval warfare, had a significant impact on the balance of power in East Asia. People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) strategists contend that sea mines are 'easy to lay and difficult to sweep; their concealment potential is strong; their destructive power is high; and the threat value is long-lasting.'.


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