The low observable (stealth) technology holds great promise in increasing the effectiveness of naval aviation in support of the maritime strategy and joint/combined operations. Although at first it may seem that stealth is a panacea for nearly all tactical missions, its use needs scrutiny, particularly in strategic implications. This paper looks at stealth and its applicability in each of the four naval missions of power projection, presence, deterrence and sea control, as well as several supporting warfare areas such as anti-air warfare and anti-surface warfare. Lastly, the operational and strategic implications of its use in representative joint/combined operations is addressed. It is found that stealth reduces the risk of many power projection missions and needs less tactical support than conventional strike aircraft. The technology is not required in all missions, however, since the risk level of the mission may not justify the cost of stealth or the mission requires high power electromagnetic energy emissions which are counter to the reason for having stealth. Low observable aircraft can support joint operations such as the AirLand Battle Doctrine of the Army, although there are limitations. Combined operations are supported tactically for the same reasons naval warfare missions are but the risk of loss of allied aircraft and crews must be properly managed to avoid dissension among the 'haves' and 'have nots' of stealth technology.


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    France. Naval aviation

    Engineering Index Backfile | 1929



    French naval aviation

    Engineering Index Backfile | 1928