A frame of reference is established which relates U.S. policies regarding both strategic defense and arms control to the deterrence of aggression and the limiting of damage should deterrence fail. Early deployment of an extensive but only partially effective strategic defense system could actually reduce security. However, strategic defense, if deployed in such a way that it did not damage the deterrent effect of assured retaliation, can make a profound contribution to national survival if deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were launched by accident or against all reason. Assured national survival, a more modest goal than perfect population defense, still presents problems of technical feasibility and possible destabilization if engaged in unilaterally. The U.S. should plan on the continued need for cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and for arms control. Policy implications include: (1) the need to reverse the erosion of the ABM treaty; (2) the desirability of enacting the 50 percent reduction negotiated in Reykjavik; and (3) during arms negotiations, the U.S. should maintain a vigorous strategic defense initiative (SDI) technology program.
SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) and/or Arms Control
1987
15 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
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