The focus of this monograph is to recommend that U.S. Army corps and division level organizations plan gap crossings -- a type of combined arms operation -- using operational art. Examination of doctrine for gap crossings shows that they are tactical problems. Corps, division, and operational art doctrine do not directly address the need to incorporate gap crossings as a part of an overall campaign. The monograph compares two case studies of gap crossings from World War II using operational art: the failed crossing of the Rapido River in Italy and the successful crossing of the Irrawaddy in Burma. The examination shows the importance of the planners' and commanders' understanding of the tactical requirements of a gap crossing and how the crossing is part of a larger operation to achieve strategic goals. Current gap crossing doctrine is tactically focused and should remain so. The author contends that operational planners and commanders at the corps and division levels must understand operational art and incorporate it into the planning of gap crossings to facilitate the overall success of a campaign.
Gap Crossings: Not Just a Tactical Problem
2011
48 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Education, Law, & Humanities , Civil Engineering , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Army planning , Crossings , Military history , Rivers , Second world war , Strategic warfare , Tactical warfare , Burma , Case studies , Corps level organizations , Division level organizations , Italy , Military commanders , Military doctrine , Army doctrine , Operational art(Military science) , Gap crossings , River crossings , Operational planning , World war ii , Rapido river(Italy) , Irrawaddy river(Burma) , Military campaigns
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