Joint Vision 2010 (W 2010) directs the armed forces to pursue a luture where smaller, faster, more lethal forces will be able achieve the effects of today's massed forces through superior C41 and more lethal weapon systems. These smaller, lighter forces will be quicker to deploy and require a significantly smaller footprint and logistics tail than forces such as those the United States deployed to Southwest Asia for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. One suggested implication of this new doctrine is that the main battle tank (MBT) will become obsolete and that its role on the battlefield could be better preformed by the attack helicopter. This obituary of the tank is premature. The MBT now provides, and will continue to provide the operational commander with capabilities that are unique and complementary to attack helicopters and precision munitions. For the operational commander, capability is a question of balance. Balanced capabilities provide choice and choice ensures options that bring success across the flill spectrum of military operatiohs.
Dominant Maneuver, A Question of Balance
1999
23 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Attack helicopters , Joint military activities , Operations other than war , Military doctrine , Battlefields , Weapon systems , Maneuvers , Logistics planning , Tanks(Combat vehicles) , Lethal agents , Dominant maneuver , Precision engagement , Main battle tank , Joint vision 2010
To Maneuver or Not to Maneuver that Is the Question
NTIS | 2018
|To Maneuver or Not to Maneuver that Is the Question
NTRS | 2018
|