The impact of the September 11, 2001, attack by Al Qaeda was reacted to worldwide with increased security measures. However, the implementation of maritime security measures was not as common a response as the implementation of other types of security measures. This thesis investigated the threat of maritime domain terrorism and what can be done to prevent maritime attacks using a system-of-systems approach. Only certain terrorist groups have the capability to launch maritime terrorist attacks. The terrorists' motive is to spread their political message in response to what they perceive as oppression. The system-of-systems model suggested that container vessels and cruise ships were potential targets. However, these maritime targets failed to match the terrorist groups' objectives. Instead, political assets such as warships and land-based maritime infrastructure aligned well with terrorists' motives. Enhancing security measures for military and maritime infrastructure may require terrorists to use uncommon forms of attack. For example, terrorists could use submersible vehicles to remain undetectable. But submersible vehicles are costly, and would limit the type and number of terrorist groups that could employ such a capability.


    Zugriff

    Zugriff über TIB

    Verfügbarkeit in meiner Bibliothek prüfen


    Exportieren, teilen und zitieren



    Maritime Terrorism

    Carnes, J. / American Petroleum Institute; Transportation Division | British Library Conference Proceedings | 1992


    Maritime Terrorism : Risk and Liability

    Greenberg, Michael D. / Chalk, Peter / Willis, Henry H. et al. | TIBKAT | 2006

    Freier Zugriff

    Maritime Terrorism : Risk and Liability

    Greenberg, Michael D. / Chalk, Peter / Willis, Henry H. et al. | GWLB - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek | 2006

    Freier Zugriff