Joint doctrine says that commanders must also exercise control over logistics. Control requires information. Logistics is not included in the warfighter's command and control system, but needs to be. Logistics in the Gulf War is examined to identify the kinds of information, and planning and analysis capabilities needed. In the Gulf War, General Schwartzkopf sought to assure that his forces had adequate sustainability by exercising control over logistics and requiring that 60 days of supply of all commodities (fuel, water, ordnance, other) be in-theater. These stockpiles took a long time to accumulate, created a huge footprint, represented potential vulnerabilities, and much of the material had to be back hauled when the war ended. This brute force approach was necessitated by the absence of sustainment planning and prediction tools. The creation of such tools and their inclusion in a combatant logistics command and control system is necessary for what the JCS is calling Focused Logistics. This report is an analysis of the requirement for and some of the characteristics of such a system.
Combatant Logistics Command and Control for the Joint Forces Commander
1998
45 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Logistics Military Facilities & Supplies , Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Military doctrine , Joint military activities , Logistics , Control , Warfare , Predictions , Tools , Vulnerability , Command and control systems , Supplies , Ordnance , Military commanders , Stockpiles , Commodities
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