It has been argued that the operational commander's decision to withdraw the aircraft carrier-based operational protection earlier than planned at Guadalcanal placed the operation in extremis. The operational commander's decision as to what was necessary and possible to protect with the aircraft carriers was based on the means available and the risk involved. In view of the information he had, his actions can be justified, but his overall command of the operation is subject to criticism. In this paper, I look at the issue of operational protection of the landing during the planning stage, and when the operational commander made the decision to withdraw it. Centers of gravity at all levels are considered in order to analyze the operations commander's decision. Lastly, I consider what the operations commander could have done better, and at the need to properly plan for operational protection in a future operation maneuver from the sea.
Operational Protection of the Guadalcanal Operation Landings
1998
22 pages
Report
Keine Angabe
Englisch
Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics , Education, Law, & Humanities , Military history , Combat support , Naval planning , Military art , Risk , Decision making , Aircraft carriers , Naval logistics , Military commanders , Carrier based aircraft , Second World War , Guadalcanal , Operational protection , Operational logistics
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